Abstract: This paper presents a somewhat new econometric framework that permits simultaneous estimation of price-cost margins, scale economies and productivity from a panel of establishment data. The econometric model contains only a few, economically interesting parameters to be estimated, but it is nevertheless consistent with a°exible (translog) underlying technology, quasi-¯xed capital and the presence of persistent di®erences in productivity between establishments. The econometric framework is applied to study market power, scale economies and productivity di®erences in a number of manufacturing industries in Norway. The results reveal statistically signi¯cant, but quite small, margins between price and marginal costs in most manufacturing industries. No industry exhibits increasing returns to scale; the average plant in most industries seems to face constant or moderately decreasing returns to scale. There is more variation in market power within the fairly narrow industry groups investigated compared to the variation between the industry groups. The results show that¯rms with higher market power tend to be less productive.
Introduction
Theoretical studies of the nature and consequences of imperfect competition and scale economies are central throughout the economic discipline. Still, the appropriate methodology to study the empirical signi¯cance of scale economies and price-cost margins remains an unsettled issue in econometrics despite its long history; see e.g. Griliches and Mairesse (1998) and Hyde and Perlo® (1995) . This paper presents an econometric framework -drawing on Hall (1988 Hall ( , 1990 to simultaneously estimate price-cost margins and scale economies using a panel of¯rm or plant level data.
The empirical part of this paper examines the importance of market power and scale economies in Norwegian manufacturing. The manufacturing sector in Norway is highly exposed to competition in export markets and from imports in domestic markets. On the other hand, it has been noticed in several case studies that regulations and anti-competitive behavior have seriously restricted competition for a number of important products such as fertilizers, cement, ships, oil rigs and other manufacturing products, at least in the domestic markets and several case studies have identi¯ed markets in Norwegian manufacturing with signi¯cant market power 1 . To the extent that trade is restricted, one might expect potential monopoly rents will induce excessive entry and therefore unexploited scale economies.
The case studies have focused on narrowly de¯ned markets chosen because they are expected to be most seriously a®ected by imperfect competition, and these market segments do not seem to be representative for the degree of market power in the Norwegian manufacturing sector, according to the empirical results presented below. The main empirical¯nding in this study is that problems with market power and unexploited scale economies seem small on average in most However, the empirical results just discussed refer to the average price-cost margins and scale elasticities within each industry. It is likely that the price-cost margins and scale coe±cients vary, perhaps substantially, within each of the industries analyzed. Consider a well known example from the U.S.; concerns about market power in the software industry is focused on Microsoft rather than on the average software producer. To examine within-industry variations in market power, I use a random coe±cient framework that allows for di®erences in market power and scale economies across¯rms within each industry. The estimates reveal more variation in market power and scale economies within an average industry, as compared to variations between industries. Interestingly, I¯nd that¯rms with higher market power also tend to be less productive, as was found by Nickell (1996) in a recent study. This suggests that lack of competition does not only create ine±cient price setting, but also productive ine±ciencies and slack.
As mentioned, the framework presented in this paper has been inspired by Hall (1988 Hall ( , 1990 . Hyde and Perlo® (1995) have argued that \the key weakness of Hall's approach ... is that one must maintain the assumption of constant returns to scale". The present paper shows how Hall's approach to estimation of market power can easily be extended to account for scale economies, and also the quasi-¯xity of capital. When estimating price cost margins, it is essential to adjust for scale economies, as the estimate of scale economies will tend to be tightly linked to the estimate of the ratio of price and marginal costs. For instance, with price and average costs as the observable point of departure, overestimating the scale economies will imply underestimated marginal costs, providing an overestimated price-marginal cost ratio. Considering the large order of magnitude of Hall's estimate of scale economies (Hall, 1990) , keeping constant returns as a maintained hypothesis in his study of price cost margins (Hall, 1988 (Hall, , 1990 questions the consistency of the estimates.
Most studies following Hall (1988) are based on industry level data 2 . However, micro level data are essential for a simultaneous study of price-cost margins and scale economies, since scale economies at the industry level are a®ected by externalities 3 , entry and exit. These are phenomena that have little to do with the scale economies relevant for the¯rms' price setting decisions. The use of plant or¯rm level panel data also has an additional bene¯t compared to studies based on industry level data as the model is implemented at the level for which it is constructed. This eliminates the well-known and important problem of aggregation and allows one to control for permanent productivity di®erences between plants (by \¯xed e®ects").
Permanent productivity di®erences between plants are known to be present in most data sets 2 Levinsohn (1993) and Harrison (1994) are two notable exceptions. 3 Bartelsman, Caballero and Lyon (1991) interpret Hall's (1990) scale estimates in terms of external economies.
on establishments and¯rms 4 , and their presence seriously questions the interpretation of results from aggregate data that are based on the notion of a representative¯rm.
More generally, the framework and analysis presented here goes beyond Hall's studies and the related studies on four accounts: (i) The framework is extended to allow for scale economies in the estimation of the margin between price and marginal costs, as discussed above.
(ii)
The model draws on the index literature for productivity measurement to allow for a°exible (translog) technology. (iii) The estimates are obtained from microdata accounting for persistent productivity di®erences between plants, as discussed above. (iv) The instrumental variables used in the GMM-estimation are extensively tested and di®er entirely from the instruments used by
Hall which have been seriously questioned 5 .
Section 2 spells out the theoretical framework. Section 3 presents the construction of the data set and variables. Stochastic assumptions, speci¯cation testing and other econometric issues are considered in section 4. The empirical results on market power and scale economies are presented and discussed in section 5. Section 6 provides the analysis of cross sectional heterogeneity in market power and productivity within industries. Section 7 gives some concluding remarks.
2 The theoretical model 2.1 Price-cost margins, scale economies and quasi-¯xed capital
The¯rms 6 within an industry are assumed to be constrained by a production function Q it = A it F t (X it ), where Q it and X it represent output and a vector of inputs for¯rm i in year t. A it is a¯rm-speci¯c productivity factor, while F t (¢) is a part of the production function common to all¯rms. The time subscript on the F -function indicates that the function can change freely between years. That is, the model does not impose constraints on the form of technical progress that is common across the¯rms within the industry, and the model is consequently consistent e.g. with factor augmenting technical progress. In section 4.2 I will introduce constraints on the idiosyncratic changes in technology, i.e. the¯rm-speci¯c changes that deviate from the industry wide changes in technology.
Using a version of the multivariate, generalized mean value theorem 7 , the production function 4 See Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) for a study of the di®erences and dynamics of plant level productivity in U.S. manufacturing and M¿en (1998) for a similar study for Norwegian manufacturing. See also Griliches and Mairesse (1998) .
5 See Abbott, Griliches and Hausmann (1988) for a critiscm of Hall's instrument set. 6 I will in the theoretical section use the term¯rm rather than plant, even though the plant is the unit of observation in the empirical analysis. As can be seen from Table 1 , a large majority of the plants belong to single-plant¯rms.
7 Cf. Berck and Syds½ter (1991, p. 11) for a statement of the generalized mean value theorem. The extension to the multivariate case is straight forward, as suggested in e.g. Thomas (1968, p.545) .
relationship can be expressed in terms of logarithmic deviations from a point of reference. This point of reference can be thought of as the level of output and inputs for the representativē rm. Rewriting the production function relationship in terms of logarithmic deviations from the representative¯rm, we haveq
where a lower case letter with a hat is the logarithmic deviation from the point of reference of the corresponding upper case letter. E.g.,q it´l n(Q it ) ¡ ln(Q t ), where Q t is the level of output for the representative¯rm, i.e. at the reference point. In the empirical application, this reference point has been chosen as the year speci¯c average value of output within the industry.
A similar (industry-year) average value is used as a reference point for each of the inputs. I will denote this reference vector for the inputs by X t = fX
it is the output elasticity for factor j 8 evaluated at an internal point ( ¹ X it )
between X it and the reference point X t 9 . I use the notation that a bar over a variable such as
indicates that it is evaluated at the internal point. Let me brie°y explain the motivation behind the use of a mean value theorem rather than ā rst or second order Taylor approximation in the derivation above. Equation (1) is a relationship in terms of cross sectional di®erences in outputs and inputs between¯rms, and such cross sectional di®erences in outputs and inputs can be of the magnitude of several hundred percent in many industries. Truncating a Taylor approximation after the¯rst or second order term might be problematic with such large di®erences in inputs 10 . Equation (1), which is derived by using the mean value theorem, is a priori suitable for samples with any size of the cross sectional di®erences in output, productivity and inputs (q it ;â it andx j it ). I will return to this issue in section 4.
According to basic producer theory, pro¯t maximizing behavior requires that marginal costs should be equal to the marginal revenue product. I assume that the¯rm has some market power
where the point Xit will be de¯ned below. 9 That is, the point ( ¹ X it ) belongs to the convex hull spanned by the coordinates fXit ; (X Thomas (1968, p.545) .
10 Consider the case with only one input X, i.e. Y = F (X), which can be rewritten in terms of log output and input as y = f (x): Take a Taylor expansion from a reference¯rm with (y0; x0) as output and input, we get
is a number which can exceed one in the cross-sectional dimension, and it is clear that strong restrictions on the derivatives of the f -function is needed for a¯rst or second order Taylor expansion to be an adequate approximation.
in the output markets, while the¯rm act as a price taker in the input markets when determining its factor inputs. Notice that this assumption is perfectly consistent with a bargaining situation where the¯rm and the union bargain over the wage rate, while the¯rm unilaterally determines the number of hours employed. Such a bargaining model has been widely considered as the appropriate model for studies of wage formation in Norwegian manufacturing 11 . First order conditions with these behavioral assumptions imply that
where W j it is the factor price for input j, while the denominator on the right hand side is marginal revenue. That is, P it is the price of output, while " it is the (conjectured) price elasticity of demand 12 . According to the theory of imperfect competition, the factor (1 ¡ 1=" it ) ¡1 represents the ratio of price and marginal costs. Denoting this ratio between price and marginal costs by ¹ it , and using the set of¯rst order conditions in equation (2), we have that
where ¹ s j it is the cost share of input j relative to total revenue. Various rigidities make it dubious to assume that (3) holds for capital, i.e. to impute the marginal product of capital from observed prices on new equipment, tax rules, interest and depreciation rates 13 . This problem can be handled as follows: The elasticity of scale in production is de¯ned by
Using (3), it follows that
11 This bargaining framework was¯rst introduced as a model for wage formation in Norwegian manufacturing by Hoel and Nymoen (1988) .
12 This price elasticity should be interpreted in a broad sense, incorporating the \conjectured price and quantity responses" of the competitors. Bresnahan (1989) has emphasized the generality of this formulation in empirical work.
13 Similarly, one could clearly argue that adjustment costs for labor should also be accounted for. To my knowledge, attempts to estimate the adjustment costs for labor in a production function relationship have had little empirical success, and have not been explored within this study.
Notice that the output elasticity of capital as constructed in (5) will vary across¯rms and over time. If we for the moment neglect the randomness in 1 it and ¹ ¹ it , equation (5) has the implication that the capital elasticity will cet. par. be high when e.g. the labor elasticity is low, and vice versa. This is quite sensible as a low labor elasticity tend to re°ect shortage of capital, i.e. a situation with a high capital elasticity.
Applying (3) for the non-capital inputs and (5) for capital, it follows that (1) can be rewritten
Using this relationship and adding the stochastic assumptions to be presented below give the econometric model to be estimated.
To summarize; only mild regularity conditions are imposed on the production technology in order to derive (6). The model is consistent with non-constant returns to scale and the presence of market power as price can exceed marginal costs. The model allows for the possibility that capital is not fully adjusted to its equilibrium value, but is considered (quasi-)¯xed while thē rm solves its short run pro¯t maximizing problem.´i t and ¹ it have the interpretation of the scale elasticity and the ratio of price to marginal costs.
A few remarks on related studies
In a recent study, Roeger (1995) has provided \an alternative method for estimating a markup of prices over marginal costs that avoids certain di±culties inherent in [Hall' s] method of estimation". Roeger's estimating procedure can be derived as follows: Consider the markup (¹) of price (P ) over marginal cost (C Q ): P = ¹C Q . Assuming constant returns to scale, we have that marginal cost is equal to average cost, i.e. C Q = C=Q. Combining these two expressions, it follows that the markup can be written
Roeger considers a cost function with wages (W ) and capital rental costs (R) as its arguments,
i.e. C = C(W; R). Instead of using (7) directly, he rewrites (7) as
where ¢y = ¢q + ¢p ¡ s L (¢l + ¢w) ¡ (1 ¡ s L )(¢k + ¢r), ¢x = ¢q + ¢p ¡ (¢k + ¢r), and B = 1 ¡ 1=¹; where a ¢ in front of a variable corresponds to its logarithmic di®erence, e.g. ¢q = dQ=Q, and s L is labor's cost share 14 . Roeger argues that estimating (8) is advantageous,
as (8) \does not require the strong identifying assumptions found in Hall's analysis", in particular the exogeneity assumptions for the instrumental variables. However, Roeger does not point out that he could have disposed of estimation altogether, by focusing directly on (7). From (7) we can directly calculate the markup, given the assumptions maintained by Roeger that (i) constant returns to scale prevail, (ii) we can impute the rental costs for capital, and (iii) capital is fully adjusted to the rental costs. These three assumptions are all relaxed in the present framework.
The framework put forward in this paper can be used to study inter¯rm di®erences in productivity and technical change, as illustrated in Klette (1996) . Indeed, the productivity measure a it in (6) is an extension of`the multilateral total factor productivity index' proposed by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) for multilateral comparisons of productivity. The productivity index of Caves et al. is also based on the concept of the representative¯rm as a benchmark for comparing productivity di®erences across a number of¯rms. The multilateral total factor productivity index is, however, based on the restrictive assumptions of constant returns to scale and competitive output markets, while these assumptions are not needed to analyze inter¯rm di®erences in productivity on the basis of the framework presented in this paper 15 .
The data
The sample covers almost all manufacturing industries for the period 1980-90 16 . The sample is based on the annual census carried out by Statistics Norway 17 . Separate estimates are presented for 14 di®erent industry groups corresponding to 2/3-digit ISIC classes. As mentioned above, the unit of observation is an establishment.
In the current study, only operating establishments with at least¯ve employees have been included. All observations that did not report the variables required have been eliminated. I also removed observations with an extreme value added per unit of labor input or extreme value added per unit of capital 18 . Establishments that existed for less than three consecutive years were eliminated. These trimming procedures together reduced the sample sizes by 5-10 percent. The present study incorporates the cost contribution of material and energy inputs, in contrast to Hall's analysis (1988 Hall's analysis ( , 1990 . Hyde and Perlo® (1995) found that \the markup estimate is sensitive to the choice of input factors included ... [Higher and incorrect markups appear] if we ... use only labor and capital (ignore materials and energy)". Norrbin (1993) has made the same observation.
The econometric issues 4.1 Constructing the shares
The theoretical model presented in section 2 includes the factor costs' share in the value of total output, evaluated at some internal point in the domain between the reference point, i.e.
19 Using the median rather than the mean as the reference point was based on the observation that the median is less in°uenced by extreme observations. However, in most industries and for most variables the di®erences between the two statistics are small and therefore unlikely to be important for the results.
20 See Manufacturing Statistics from Statistics Norway (several years), and Halvorsen et al. (1991) for details about these adjustments.
21 At least in principle, the employed output measure also accounts for repair works for customers, investment activities done by the plants' workers and a number of other (minor) outputs; see Halvorsen et al. (1991, ch . VI.5) for details.
22 This help us to overcome the criticism to scale estimates based on accounting measures of capital, raised by Friedman (1955) . Friedman argued that accounting measures of capital would imply constant return by de¯nition. See Griliches and Ringstad (1971, ch. 3.3 and p.59) for further remarks on the pros and cons of the use of¯re insurance values to construct the capital variable.
the industry-year median values, and the observed level of operation for the establishment in question. Since the location of this particular point and the corresponding shares are unknown, I have approximated the shares by taking the average value of the share for the observed establishment and the time-industry median share. The \Quadratic approximation lemma" in Diewert (1976) shows that using this average cost share of factor j to replace ¹ ® j it in (1) will introduce no approximation error if the underlying technology is of the translog type. Hence, the empirical model is exact for a translog technology which may vary from industry to industry and year to year.
The framework is consistent with the widely recognized pattern that di®erent¯rms within an industry face di®erent wages. In particular, it has been documented in a number of studies that larger¯rms tend to pay higher wages and hire more high-skilled workers 23 . The model presented here captures these phenomena in two ways: (i) The¯xed e®ects will capture di®erences in productivity levels between¯rms due to di®erences in labor quality. (ii) Using the factor shares of individual establishments in the way described above, the model is also consistent with variations in the output elasticity of labor and the other factors of production across observations 24 .
In constructing the labor share using (2), it is appropriate to use the marginal wage rate, which might di®er from the average wage rate when overtime work is the marginal labor input.
However, our data set does not contain information about overtime work or overtime pay, so I have used the average wage rate as is done in most econometric¯rm level studies. Since the average wage rate is lower than the wage rate at the margin for¯rms using overtime labor, there might be a downward bias in the shares, which will bias the estimated markups upwards.
Fixed e®ects
As mentioned above (cf. footnote 4), productivity di®erences between¯rms tend to be highly persistent over time. These productivity di®erences are important determinants of growth and exit 25 . The termâ it will be represented by an error component structure;
where a i is treated as a¯xed (correlated) e®ect, while u it is a random error term. Treating a i as a¯xed e®ect means that we allow the cross sectional di®erences in productivity between establishments to be freely correlated with all the variables in the estimating equation, i.e.
23 See e.g. Brown and Medo® (1989) for an empirical analysis of the employer size-wage relationship. 24 The most common panel data model of production seems to be the Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation with¯xed e®ects. A Cobb-Douglas model with¯xed e®ect is consistent with (i), but not (ii).
25 Klette and Mathiassen (1996) show that measured productivity is an important determinant of plant survival in Norwegian manufacturing. See also Olley and Pakes (1996) . output and all factor inputs. Initial tests for the presence of¯xed versus random (uncorrelated) e®ects strongly rejected the hypothesis of random e®ects, as is widely experienced with these kinds of data (Griliches and Mairesse, 1998) . Notice that technical change common across plants within an industry is captured by measuring all variables as deviations from time-industry averages.
There can be several explanations for the presence of¯xed e®ects as captured by a i . Establishments might di®er in the e®ectiveness of the management, labor quality, the vintage of the capital and so fourth. Such di®erences will emerge as variations in productivity. More to the point, these productivity di®erences will tend to be positively correlated with size, in the sense that more productive establishments will gain larger market shares. Another possible explanation for¯xed e®ects is that some establishments do not have their own headquarter activities, while others do. This will show up in measured productivity. Furthermore, if there is a correlation between establishment size and the frequency of establishments incorporating their own headquarter services, the estimates will be inconsistent unless¯xed (correlated) e®ects are incorporated into the estimated model. Whatever the reason, the model and the data require ā xed e®ect formulation. To eliminate the¯xed e®ect, the model is estimated in terms of¯rst di®erences (see below).
The scale coe±cients presented in this paper are long-run scale elasticities, as they incorporate changes in both variable factors (materials, energy and working hours) and capital. But the approach focuses on changes in the level of operation in the longitudinal dimension, and disregards the cross-sectional information about e±ciency di®erences in small versus large plants.
Some people have argued that cross sectional comparisons of establishments is more relevant to understand long-run scale economies. However, the comparison in e±ciency between small and large plants raises the question of causality: Are large plants more e±cient because they are large (which would support claims about scale economies), or have they grown larger than other plants because they are more e±cient (due to e.g. better technology or better management) 26 ? This question raises doubt about whether cross-sectional di®erences in e±ciency can be interpreted as evidence on scale economies 27 .
The orthogonality conditions and GMM-estimation
Inserting (9) into (6), and taking¯rst di®erences to eliminate the¯xed e®ect (a i ), we obtain the estimating equation
where I have de¯ned the variablex
and ¢q it =q it ¡q i;t¡1 and so fourth. ¢v it is given as v it ¡ v it¡1 , where
Equation (10) can not be consistently estimated by OLS for two reasons. First, allowing for¯xed e®ects by estimating the model in growth rates might not solve the whole problem of correlation between the productivity di®erences, u it , and the di®erences in¯rms' choices of factor inputs. To the extent that a¯rm experiences changes in productivity over time relative to the average¯rm, a productivity shock might be correlated with changes in factor inputs to the extent that the shock is anticipated before the factor demands are determined 28 . This will create a correlation between the right hand side variables and the error term in (10). Second, errors-in-variables due to reporting errors will create an endogeneity problem. The errors-in-variables problem is well known to be augmented when estimating the model in¯rst di®erences (cf. the discussion in Griliches and Mairesse, 1998) .
The model has been estimated using orthogonality assumptions between ¢v it and alternative sets of instruments:
where Z is is a vector of instruments dated s.
Two steps have been taken to ensure that the instrument set is chosen so that the condition (12) is ful¯lled. First, the instrument set has been restricted to two variables: the capital variable and the number of employees. These variables are less responsive than the inputs materials, energy and man-hours, to temporary changes in productivity 29 ; see Bi¿rn and Klette (1996) for some econometric support to this claim. Second, within this set of instruments,
28 Olley and Pakes (1996) have also addressed this problem, but in a di®erent way than I do. See also Griliches and Mairesse (1998) for a discussion of the problem.
29 Lagged values ofx V it could also been considered as instruments, but these additional instruments did not signi¯cantly improve the precision of the estimates.
alternative orthogonality assumptions have been tested. I have tested the assumptions whether the instruments are strictly exogenous, predetermined or (only) contemporaneously correlated with the errors. That is to say, I have tested whether condition (12) holds for:
(I) All values of t and s.
(II) Only for non-contemporaneous instruments, i.e. jt ¡ sj¸1. Such an instruments set is interesting when the error term in (10) is not autocorrelated beyond an MA(1) structure 30 .
(III)-(V) Only predetermined instruments, i.e. t ¡ s¸l, for three di®erent values of l; l = 0; 1 or 2:
There are¯ve alternative speci¯cations of the orthogonality conditions and the procedure used to discriminate between these speci¯cations will be discussed below.
GMM provides the optimal way to combine the set of orthogonality conditions (12). The GMM estimator (1;^) minimizes
where I have stacked all the ¢v it 's in (10) into a single vector ¢v, and Z is a matrix with all the instruments 31 . N is the total number of observations.V is a consistent estimator of the covariance matrix of (Z 0 ¢v). The main results presented below is based on the one step GMM -estimator, whereV is replaced with N ¡1 P i Z 0 HZ and H is a square matrix with twos in the main diagonal, minus ones in the¯rst subdiagonals and zeros otherwise 32 .
The various speci¯cations have been tested by means of the overidenti¯cation test based on the minimized value of J in (13), which asymptotically has a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom given as the number of orthogonality conditions minus the number of parameters (see e.g. Newey (1985) and Arellano and Bond (1991) ). A more powerful test of nested orthogonality assumptions can be based on di®erences in the J-values for the competing speci¯cations, as explained by Arellano and Bond. I will refer to such a test as a J-di®erence test. Details of the test procedure is given in appendix B.
30 Griliches and Hausman (1986) and Bi¿rn and Klette (1996) have discussed and applied similar instrument sets.
31 The care needed in stacking the instrument vector in the presence of an unbalanced set of panel data has been discussed by Bond (1988, 1991) . See also Bi¿rn and Klette (1996) . The GMM-estimates presented in the current study have been obtained using the GAUSS-program \DPD" documented in Arrelano and Bond (1988) .
32 I have reported one step rather than two step GMM estimates since the standard errors associated with the two step estimates tend to be seriously downward biased, as noticed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and others. The two step estimates are reported in a previous version of this paper, cf. Klette (1994) .
Some additional remarks on the choice of IVs
Both Hall and the present study apply an instrumental variable approach to the estimation of the markups and other parameters of interest. Hall pointed out the need for instruments due to the correlation between productivity shocks buried in the residual and factor demands, as discussed in the previous section. This correlation has motivated the choice of the number of employees and capital as instruments in the present study. Let me emphasize that the instrument set used here is entirely di®erent from Hall's instrument set which consisted of the oil price, military spending and a dummy for the party of the president.
Abbott, Griliches and Hausman (1988) have argued forcefully that the oil price is not a valid instrument. They emphasized the omission of adjustment for capacity utilization in the models estimated by Hall. Their point is that this omitted variable problem creates biases since Hall's instruments, in particular the oil price, are correlated with a left out variable; the degree of capacity utilization. Hall adjusts for changes in capacity utilization of capital by using a residual share to impute the output elasticity of capital, but his procedure is only correct to the extent that constant returns to scale is a valid maintained hypothesis. In the present study, the constant returns to scale hypothesis is rejected in several industries and relaxing this hypothesis signi¯cantly reduces the markup estimates. Both Hall and the present study use man-hours as the measure of labor inputs. This should reduce the need to adjust for changes in utilization of the work force 33 . Finally, notice that to the extent my instruments are invalid, they are likely to bias the parameter-estimates upward since e.g. a positive productivity shock will typically stimulate investment and hiring.
Estimates of markups and scale elasticities 5.1 Speci¯cation testing
The results from the speci¯cation tests are presented in Table 2 the results based on instrument set II for this industry, but comment also on the results based on instrument set IV 34 . For the industries 355-6 and 382 the instrument sets III and IV, respectively, are preferred. None of the instrument sets have been accepted for industry 342. As we shall see below, this industry stands out in several respects 35 .
Average markups and scale elasticities
The¯rst row in Table 3 shows the markups estimates and the second row shows the estimated scale elasticities. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the results reported in Table 3 is that the markups and the scale elasticities are close to one, and that there are few statistically signi¯cant di®erences in market power between the industries considered. Still, a majority of the industries considered in this study reveal small, but statistically signi¯cant market power. Even if the di®erences in market power across industries are small and to a large extent not statistically signi¯cant, it is natural to examine whether the estimated di®erences across industries in market power can be related to some external measures of market power. I have therefore considered the correlation between the markups in Table 3 and di®erences in a He¯ndahl index of industry concentration, an index of import penetration and di®erences in export shares 38 , 34 Cf. the discussion on the choice of non-nested speci¯cations in appendix B. For the three industries -322-4, 331 and 381 -the instrument set I has not been rejected in a direct test against II. But the instrument set III, which is strictly larger than I, has been rejected. Hence, the instrument set I should also be rejected.
35 A number of experiments, such as splitting the industry up into¯ner industry categories and restricting the instrument set further, have been run on this industry without success. The results were poorest for the subindustry group \Printing and bookbinding" (ISIC 3421). A more detailed investigation of the industry 342 is left for future research.
36 Choosing instruments based on observations dated t ¡ 1 and earlier, provided an estimated price-cost margin at 1.005 (std.err: 0.012) and a scale elasticity at 0.930 (std.err: 0.010).
37 The alternative choice of instruments, based on predetermined instruments dated t ¡ 2 and earlier, provided an estimated price-cost margin at 1.137 (std.err: 0.032) and a scale elasticity at 0.963 (std.err: 0.026).
38 I have considered both correlations in levels and in rankings.
but these analyses revealed no signi¯cant relationship. This is perhaps not too surprising for at least two reasons. First, such an analysis should control for product di®erentiation and market segmentation as all the industries considered produce a number of di®erent products and varieties 39 . However, empirically useful measures of product di®erentiation and market segmentation are di±cult to derive even in principle, not to mention the practical problems with data availability. Second, the Her¯ndahl indices referred to above is based on detailed output observations at the¯rm level 40 . But¯rm-level data is not adequate for this purpose, as a number of the manufacturing¯rms in Norway are integrated into interlocking groups of¯rms. Unfortunately, the available data sets do not contain information on these ownership structures. Consider as an example of the di±culties involved, Paper products (341) which is the industry with the second highest markup. This industry is not particularly concentrated when we consider the Her¯ndahl index based on¯rm level data, but most of the largest¯rms in this industry are organized into an interlocking group of¯rms (Norske Skog). Furthermore, domestic concentration is not an obvious proxy for market power in this case as the industry is highly export oriented with an export share exceeding 50 percent in 1985. The metal industry (37) which has the highest markup in Table 3 , has a similar industry structure with a high export share and high concentration, 39 Even in industries producing basic metals, product di®erentiation can be an important source of market power. In comenting on the market position for the Norwegian¯rm Falconbridge, a leading world producer of cobolt, its director states: \Not only are we a large producer of cobolt, we are also making the best cobolt in the world which is in high demand for jet enginees and super turbines." (Dagens N½ringsliv, 26.3.98. My translation.) .
40 More precisely, the Her¯ndahl index of concentration was constructed on the basis of observations for each business unit, using output reported at the line of business level for each individual¯rm. Separate indexes were constructed for more than one hundred 5-digit industries, and then aggregated to the 3 digit level with industry output as weights. Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) have used both Roeger's (1995) and Hall's (1988) procedures to estimate the market power in 36 manufacturing industries for 14 OECD countries, including Norway, over the 1970-92 period. Their analysis is based on industry level data. Considering their estimates for Norwegian manufacturing for the period 1980-92, they tend to be somewhat higher than the estimates presented in Table 3 it has become a widely held view that scale estimates from cross sectional studies are upward biased, as they do not account for persistent di®erences in e±ciency between plants; see Griliches and Mairesse (1998) .
A comparison to related results
As discussed in the introduction, it is di±cult to relate my results on market power to case studies such as Gabrielsen (1989) and the studies surveyed in S¿rgard (1997) , as these case studies typically study markets covering very small and not representative parts of the markets faced by the manufacturing¯rms in the industries I consider. For instance, in his study of the fertilizer market in Norway, Gabrielsen found signi¯cant market power for the leading producer (Norsk Hydro). Production of fertilizers is a part of the Chemical industry (351-2), where Ī nd little evidence of market power. The results are not necessarily contradictory, however, since about 80 percent of the Norwegian production of fertilizers is exported, and production of fertilizers is only about a¯fth of total production in the Chemicals industry. Intraindustry variations in market power will be examined in section 6.
41 Comparing the estimates is not entirely straightforward as the levels of industry aggregation do not perfeclty match between the two studies.
Additional remarks on the econometric speci¯cation
Let me add a few comments on the test-statistics for¯rst and second order autocorrelation in the residuals in Table 3 . The presence of signi¯cant¯rst order autocorrelation is expected given that the model is estimated in¯rst di®erences, but the presence of signi¯cant second order autocorrelation questions the use of lagged values of the regressors as instruments 42 . Cyclical errors could for instance be due to more rapid response of output than labor input to cyclical shocks, even with working hours as the employed measure of labor input. Notice, however, that my instruments are not exactly lagged regressors but lagged (and in some cases leaded) values of capital inputs and the number of employees as discussed in section 4.3 above. To examine the importance of potential endogeneity problems, I have in the speci¯cation testing considered estimates based on restricted instrument sets, and Table 3 reports these estimates when the speci¯cation tests or the parameter estimates suggest that estimates based on restricted instrument sets are preferable.
A direct comparison of the parameter estimates based on di®erent instrument sets con¯rm that the estimates in Table 3 are not strongly a®ected by restricting the instrument set further.
The estimates based on the most restricted instrument set are not signi¯cantly di®erent from the preferred estimates reported in Table 3 43 . A possible exception is the point estimate for the metal industry (ISIC 37) which is somewhat lower with the most restricted instrument set, but the standard error of the markup estimate is high with this instrument set.
The markup and the scale coe±cient estimates presented in Table 3 share a problem with most microeconometric studies of market power and scale elasticities, according to an argument put forward by Klette and Griliches (1996) . Klette and Griliches identi¯ed a downward bias in the estimation of scale elasticities caused by replacing real output by de°ated sales, where de°ation is based on an industry-wide de°ator. Such a de°ating procedure is essentially equivalent to the normalization approach used in the present study. The point is that if idiosyncratic productivity shocks are important determinants of¯rm growth, growth in de°ated sales will be a systematically biased indicator for growth in real output. This bias in the growth rate in the output measure tends to create a downward bias in estimated scale coe±cients, and such a downward bias might be present in the estimates of the scale coe±cients (and consequently in 42 Most of the reported test statistics are signi¯cant at the 5 percent level, while four of the test statistics are signi¯cant at the 1 percent level. Given the large sample sizes in most industries, a conservative 1 percent signi¯cant level might be considered appropriate.
43 Consider in particular the four industries with the highest test statistics for second order autocorrelation as reported in Table 3 . The markup estimates for these industries based on the most restricted instrument set are: 1.10 (.030) for ISIC 331; 1.13 (.040) for ISIC 341; 0.986 (.070) for ISIC 37; 1.020 (.042) for ISIC 382. the markups) presented above.
6 Heterogeneity in market power, scale economies and productivity 6.1 Measuring heterogeneity in market power, scale economies and productivity
The markups presented above are not very large, and suggests little reason for worries about large welfare losses. But concerns about market power is often focused on one or a few leadinḡ rms in an industry while the average competitor has little market power, as argued in the introduction. The price-cost margins and scale elasticities presented above represent averages for di®erent industries, and it is interesting to examine whether there are large variations in market power and scale economies within each industry. If we are willing to impose a few additional assumptions, these variations can be estimated by a method suggested by Hildreth and Houck (1968) 44 . Consider the residuals
! it captures sampling error and the annual°uctuations in the markup and scale coe±cients. Let us now assume that ! it is uncorrelated withx is , when jt ¡ sj > l, for some value of l (=1,2,3..).
Then, one can show that
where ¾ 2 a is the variance of the a i 's, i.e. the variance of the permanent productivity di®erences between plants. ¾ 2 ¹ and ¾ 2 are the variances of the price-cost margins and the scale elasticities;
¾ 2 a¹ ; ¾ 2 a´a nd ¾ 2 ¹´r epresent the covariances between the di®erences in productivity, the price-cost margins and the scale elasticities. From (15) it follows that
where E(e its jx V it ;x K it ;x V is ;x K is ) = 0 when jt¡sj > l. Equation (15) has the form of a familiar linear regression model and the variances and covariances
¹´c an consequently be estimated by regressing cross-products of the residual term on thex it 's and their squares and cross-products. There are many possible choices of t and s; the most e±cient estimates of the ¾ 2 s are obtained by pooling the estimates by combining all permissible combinations and Table   4 reports the outcome of such an estimation procedure 45 . It turned out that the estimated covariances were insensitive to the choice of l in (15), and all the estimates in Table 4 are based on l=1. Table 4 shows that the variation in price-cost margins is largest in Plastics (355-6) and smallest in Textiles (321) and Paper products (341). The average value of these variances is 0.004 46 , which is 4 times the variance of the markups across industries presented in Table 3 . This nding con¯rms the argument that market power tend to vary more across¯rms within the same industry, than across the average¯rm in di®erent industries.
Empirical¯ndings on heterogeneity
Firms with higher productivity tend to set lower markups, as can be seen from the negative values of ¾ a¹ in Table 4 . In other words, plants in more competitive niches of an industry tend to be forced to be more productive and to charge a lower markup. This result is in accordance with the¯nding recently reported by Nickell (1996) that market power not only create ine±cient pricing, but also reduces incentives for e±cient organization of production. Nickell concludes on the basis of a study of 670 U.K. companies, \that competition ... is associated with higher rates of total factor productivity growth". Harrison (1994) has also presented related evidence on the links between trade protection, productivity and market power.
Turning to heterogeneity in the scale elasticities, the largest variance is in and the smallest is in Metal products (381). The weighted average variance is 0.003, which is 3 times as large as the variance of the scale elasticities across industries presented in Table 3 .
In this sense, there are larger di®erences also in the scale coe±cient within each industry as compared to between industries.
The results in Table 4 reveal signi¯cant di®erences in permanent productivity levels (cf.
the¯xed e®ects) across plants within all industries except one. The largest variance appears in Paper products (341), with ¾ 2 a = 0:043, and the smallest in Plastics, with ¾ 2 a = 0:001 (not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero). The weighted average of these variances across industries is 0.013, using the inverse of the standard errors as weights.
Finally, notice that although this section has emphasized the presence of large di®erences in market power across¯rms in the same industry, it has not identi¯ed what¯rm or product characteristics (e.g. R&D intensity, product quality 47 or¯rm size) explain these di®erences. At an early stage of this research project, I examined the relationship between the markup, scale economies and¯rm size, but I found little systematic relationship between size and the other measures. I believe this¯nding re°ects a problem related to the di±culty of de¯ning the size of the relevant market. In Norway as in most other countries, the larger manufacturing¯rms are often more export oriented than smaller¯rms in the same industry and the large¯rms may consequently face stronger market competition. This is true even when the industries are narrowly de¯ned. In future work it would be interesting to search for industries where independent measures of market power can be obtained, and incorporate these into the speci¯cation of the markup in the econometric framework presented above 48 .
Remarks on parameter stability
Panel data studies of productivity and scale economies using plant level data are often based on a Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation of the technology. Mairesse and Griliches (1990) found substantial heterogeneity and instability in the coe±cients of their estimated Cobb-Douglas production functions for US, French and Japanese¯rms. The¯ndings by Griliches and Mairesse suggest that a more°exible speci¯cation of the technology is desirable, and the framework presented in this paper provides such a°exible framework (cf. section 4.1). The parameter estimates in the present study are substantially more stable than the parameters estimated by Mairesse and Griliches (1990) : The variances of the productivity di®erences (cf. ¾ 2 a ) and the scale elasticities (or the markups) are between one and two order of magnitudes smaller than the coe±cient variances found by Mairesse and Griliches (1990, see in particular Table 6 ).
Perhaps a natural response to the¯ndings by Griliches and Mairesse would be to focus on°e xible assumptions about functional forms, but estimation of°exible functional forms often create problems with the concavity conditions when¯xed e®ects are allowed for in the econometric analysis of panel data. The simple parametric structure, yet°exible speci¯cation of the econometric model presented above is a signi¯cant advantage in panel data studies compared to more heavily parametrized econometric models.
47 Notice that higher prices on products with higher quality produced by using more inputs (cf. leather seats and more horse power in cars) will not show up as market power within the present model. 48 That is, one could model the markup in terms of observable¯rm, product and market characteristics, Mit, such that ¹it = ¹(Mit). Such characteristics could include indicators for market concentration,¯rm size, product characteristics and business cycle conditions.
Concluding remarks
This paper has presented a framework for estimating price-cost margins and scale economies from a panel of plant level data, allowing for considerable°exibility and heterogeneity in the technological constraints facing di®erent¯rms. Applying this econometric framework to 14 industries in Norwegian manufacturing, I found that:
² Estimated (average) margins between price and marginal costs are statistically signi¯cant, but small in economic terms. Price exceeds marginal costs by between 5 and 10 percent in most of the industries considered.
² Increasing returns to scale is not a widespread phenomenon in Norwegian manufacturing.
Rather, the average¯rm in most industries seems to face constant or moderately decreasing return to scale.
² There is more within-industry variation in market power compared to the variation in market power between the industries considered.
² Plants (¯rms) with higher market power tend to be less productive.
Given the large interest in non-competitive models and theories about increasing returns in the economic discipline, the results presented in this paper are perhaps somewhat surprising. However, the model with persistent productivity di®erences and parameter estimates suggesting moderate decreasing returns is consistent with Lucas' famous`span-of-control' model (Lucas, 1978) which has been the basis for much theoretical and empirical work on¯rm growth,¯rm heterogeneity and industry evolution 49 .
Appendix A: Details on the construction of the labor and capital variables
This appendix presents details about the construction of the labor and capital input variables used in the present study.
Before 1982, man-hours referred to blue collar workers only. Following Griliches and Ringstad (1971, p.24) , total labor input (X L it ) was estimated according to the formula
where H it is man-hours for blue collar workers. C wc it and C bc it refer to total wage costs for white collar and blue collar workers. After 1982, the total number of man-hours was reported (while man-hours for blue collar workers alone were not), and used as the labor input variable.
As in most studies, capital inputs are perhaps the most problematic of the variables used in my analysis. My sample has an advantage to most other production data sets, in that the establishments report total¯re insurance values for machinery and buildings (separately). Rental costs for rented capital are also reported. One of the problems with the¯re insurance values is that there are a lot of missing values. Also, these variables have not been used by Statistics Norway, and little e®ort has been put into identifying and correcting erroneous reports. Once more, I have followed Griliches and Ringstad (1971, p.27) and estimated the capital services as
where R it is rental costs, ½ is a real rate of return, and ± M and ± B are depreciation rates for machinery and buildings. ½ is chosen as the average real rate of return to physical capital in manufacturing (0.07), and the depreciation rates are taken from the Norwegian National Accounts (0.06 and 0.02 for machinery and buildings, respectively). V M it and V B it are the¯re insurance values for machinery and buildings at the beginning of the year. ½; ± M and ± B are to be considered as rough weights, and the validity of these weights varies substantially across plants and years. An interesting topic for future work would be to estimate the weights as an integrated part of the econometric modeling.
To avoid losing too many observations due to missing¯re insurance values, and to eliminate some noise, three di®erent estimates of the¯re insurance value were calculated for each observation (plant-year). In addition to the reported¯re insurance values for year t, the¯re insurance values were also estimated by a perpetual inventory method on the basis of investment¯gures and¯re insurance values for the years t + 1, t and t ¡ 1 (if available). The mean value of the three di®erent estimates was used as the¯nal estimate.
Appendix B: The speci¯cation testing
The minimized value of J in (13) has asymptotically a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom given as the number of orthogonality conditions minus the number of parameters (see e.g. Newey, 1985, and Bond, 1991) . I have used this J-statistic to test the validity of the various speci¯cations discussed above. Only models with su±ciently low J-values have been considered as acceptable. Newey (1985) has pointed out that even though the J-statistic comes closest to be an omnibus test for misspeci¯cation for models estimated by GMM, it has some limitations and he shows how the J-statistic may fail to detect misspeci¯ed. models.
A more focused speci¯cation test that considers a speci¯c subset of a priori suspect instruments is desirable. Arellano and Bond (1991) have shown that this can easily be done for nested hypotheses on the basis of the J-statistics: Denote the J-statistic for the extended instrument set by J E , and consider a subset of instruments, with J-statistic J M , that is considered valid under the maintained hypothesis. In that case, J E ¡ J M has a Chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom given by the di®erence in the number of orthogonality conditions between the two sets of instruments (see Arellano and Bond (1991) for a formal derivation of this result).
I refer to such a test as a J-di®erence test.
The test scheme between the alternative sets of orthogonality conditions are presented in gure 1. The procedure has been as follows: I have started at the top, with model V. If that speci¯cation is accepted on the basis of its J-statistic, the next model (with additional orthogonality conditions) has been considered; see model IV (neglect model II for the moment).
That next model has been preferred if it does not fail on the basis of its J-statistic, or on the basis of the J-di®erence test for the two models.
As shown in¯gure 1, model I corresponds to using all leads and lags (of capital and the number of employees) as instruments. Model II uses only non-contemporaneous instruments, i.e. when instrumenting for growth rates from t ¡ 1 to t, only variables dated t ¡ 2 and earlier and t + 1 and later are used as instruments. Model III restricts the instrument set only to predetermined variables, dated t and earlier, while model IV and V restrict the instrument sets to respectively t ¡ 1 and t ¡ 2 and earlier.
There is one problem with this procedure. An instrument set based on predetermined vari-ables dated, say, t ¡ 1 and earlier (see model IV in¯g. 1) does not nest the instrument set based on non-contemporaneous variables (model II in¯g. 1). There is no clear cut answer to which model to prefer when two such models are competing. In the present case, the estimates based on the non-contemporaneous instruments have been reported in the tables, but I have also discussed the estimates of the alternative speci¯cation in the text.
